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KHOMEINI AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
NOTES ON CRIME AND CULTURE*
GRAEME NEWMAN**
The Ayatollah Khomeini has said:
Islamic justice is based on simplicity and ease. It settles all criminal
and civil complaints and in the most convenient, elementary, and expeditious way possible. All that is required is for an Islamic judge, with pen
and inkwell and two or three enforcers, to go into a town, come to his
verdict on any kind of case, and have it immediately carried out. .... I

It requires little imagination to insert a character from the old
American Wild West into the imagery of Khomeini's justice, with the
exception that this hero would ride into town with a gun instead of pen
and ink, and would do his own enforcing. The simplicity and clarity of
justice in both images surely tempts the romantics among us.
The essential difference between the folklore figure and the Ayatollah Khomeimi, however, is that the western hero depicts the uneducated, raw man of the frontier, bringing an innocence, a freshness to the
uncivilized society of the Wild West. He represents, really, a kind of
"human justice"--a highly optimistic and benign view of man's nature,
yet a nature without God. Khomeini, on the other hand, depicts the
opposite: a highly educated man, a man who stands for 1,380 years (or
thereabouts) of learning, who represents not human justice, but divine
justice.
In Khomeini's view, Iranian society is decivilized rather than
uncivilized. His people have been corrupted by the wrong laws and values of the United States, whereas those folks in the Wild West had simply been separated from their laws-a situation of no law, rather than
the wrong law.
How is it that two vastly different roles produce strikingly similar
* This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented to the Fourth International
Seminar on "Culture and Criminality," International Center of Penal and Penitentiary
Research, Messina, Italy, Dec. 6, 1980.
** Professor and Associate Dean, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New
York at Albany. Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1972; B.A. and Diplomas of Criminology
and Education, Melbourne University, Australia, 1964-68.
1 AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, SAYINGS OF THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, 30 (H. Salemson
trans. 1979).
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conceptions of justice, that is, a justice of retribution, directness, clarity,
openness, defense of the weak, and above all, authoritarianism? We
think of the justice as depicted in the Wild West as "rough," or "primitive;" would this assessment fit Khomeini's version of Islamic justice?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to take a preliminary look at the basics of Islamic law, and its special application by the
Ayatollah Khomeini to the Shiite sect. It is important to stress at the
outset, though, that although Khomeini derives his teachings from Islam, he is hardly a typical representative of Islamic law. As will shortly
become clear, his application of Islamic law is, in one important respect,
highly idiosyncratic.

I.

THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW

Although Khomeini and other important Islamic scholars would
argue that Islamic law is essentially of divine origin (since everything is
created by God) we may nevertheless recognize that there are two
sources of Islamic law; law which was revealed through divine revelation
to Muhammad, the Qur'dn, and law which was present before the revelation, which is called custom. In this sense, Islam is quite similar to
Christianity, since both represent a drastic change with the past, yet
have also incorporated in their different ways many of the values, rules
2
and laws prior to their periods of revelation.
The pre-Islamic law is known as the Sunna, roughly translated as
"customary law." This customary law was largely an oral tradition of
justice whose function was to settle disputes, mainly within tribes. It
served not only to support the authority of the tribal chief but also as a
check against it.3 Customary law thrived especially among the desert
tribes whose austere life was supplemented by an intricate life style
based on honor, blood money and vendetta (thdr).4 In such an ambi2 St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and more explicitly Dante incorporated much of the
logic and morals of the early pagans into their works on moral philosophy. Thus Christian
doctrine became, and continues to be, a mixture of Christian and pagan beliefs. The distinction between the two, however, unlike Islam, has been largely lost, or at least is not as formalized as it is in Islam. Some Islamic scholars have gone to pains to point out that Islamic law is
not strictly speaking a divine law, by comparing it to canon law. However, in comparison to
English common law, the difference is clear. There has been a conscious attempt to secularize
common law. See Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to OtherLegalSytems, 26 AM. J. COMP. L 187
(1978). If one reads the official statements of the role of Islamic Law, there is no doubt that it
is seen as essentially a religious legal system. See MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, KINGDOM OF
SAUDI ARABIA, THE EFFECT OF IsLAMic LEGISLATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI

AaBIA (1980).
3 M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM (1955).
MIDVALUES OF MEDrrERRA-

4 See J. BLAcK-MICHAuD, COHESIVE FORCE: FEUD IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND

DLE EAST (1975); and J. PERISTIANY, HONOUR AND SHAME: Ti
NEAN SociETY (1965).
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ence of incipient chaos, the notion of retributory punishment was
born-or at least its social functions were recognized. 5 Many of these
forms of punishment and types of crime were preserved by Muhammad
whose aim, it is said, was not to violate the established Sunna, but simply to get rid of idolatry. There is much argument on this point by
Islamic scholars since it is also claimed that idolatry was a violation of
the Sunna and that Muhammad was indeed concerned with overthrow6
ing the Sunna and replacing it with the new divine law of the Qur'd.n.
The fact remains, however, that many crimes and punishments which
were pre-Islamic were continued, indeed, were promulgated by Muhammad (e.g., cutting off the hands of a thief, killing the murderer) 7-a fact,
of course, that is not surprising to social historians.
Upon Muhammad's death in 632 A.D., the enactment of laws
stopped. Unfortunately, he died at the time when the Islamic empire
was beginning to spread out into new territories. New problems and
situations arose, requiring new applications of the Qur'dn. It was during these first three hundred years that the four classical 9chools of Islamic law arose.8 It was also during this period that an important
5 G. NEWMAN, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE (1979). It is of some interest that the wellknown Islamic punishment of cutting off the hand of the thief is thought of as purely retributory: a punishment that reflects the crime. Khadduri, however, claims that it was purely
incapacitatory to prevent the offender from extracting revenge (for his punishment received)
by violent assault. M. KHADDURI, supra note 3, at 21. This interpretation is probably not
correct, since it fails to recognize that feuds and vendettas were (and are) essentially group or

tribal endeavors so that a relative of the chief could just as easily extract vengeance on another's behalf. See Haft-Picker, Byond the Subculture of Vionlmce, in CRIME AND DEVIANCE: A
COMPARATIvE PERSPEcTIVE (G. Newman ed. 1980). It is of interest that the official inter-

pretation of this punishment by Saudi Arabia is now essentially one of deterrence. See supira
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, note 2.

6 This controversy is the source of many divisions and sects in Islam. The Qur'in, after
all, claims to have given a detailed account of everything: "We have revealed to you a book
explaining everything," Qr'n LXXVIII: 29, and "We have neglected nothing in the book,"
Qur'n VI: 38. Other scholars see nothing wrong in accepting pre-Islamic laws so long as they
are not discounted by the Qur'dn. M. KHADDURI, supra note 3, at 19-20. See also Coulson,
Law andReligion in Contemfiora7 Islam, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1447 (1978).

7 A major change would appear to be Muhammad's extensive pronouncements on the
family, especially adultery and marriage. "Forbidden to you are your mothers, and your
daughters, and your sisters, and your father's sisters and your mother's sisters and your
brother's daughters and your foster mother's.. . ." Qurn IV: 23. Before Islam, the male
could marry his stepmother or even his wife's sisters. See W. ROBERTSON SMITH, KINSHIP
AND MARRIAGE IN EARLY ARABIA (1907); G. STERN, MARRIAGE IN EARLY ISLAM (1939);
Khadduri, Maiage in Islamic Law: The Modernist Fiewpioints, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 213 (1978).

8 Scholars generally agree that four basic schools of Islam arose during this period, and
these tend to predominate in certain geographic areas today. These schools were essentially
founded by four individual scholars: (1) Abu Hanifa of Iraq who depended mainly on reasoning and analogical interpretation of the Qur'in and Sunna and less on the Hadith. This
school is dominant today in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan; (2) Malik b. Anas, the codifier of the Hadith who saw the center of Islam at Medina,

representing the Hijazis. Now dominant in North Africa, West Africa and Kuwait; (3) al-
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ancillary body of law was developed, called the Hadith or "tradition."
A fine distinction must be drawn here between tradition and customary
law. We have seen that customary law, the Sunna, was the oral traditions of justice that were essentially pre-Islamic and were probably incorporated into the Qur'dn by Muhammad (even though we are told
that it was God who revealed the laws to Muhammad, who simply
wrote them down). Regardless of who was the medium, we can
nevertheless find much of the Sunna in the Qur'dn.
Hadith, or tradition, on the other hand, was a collection of sayings,
statements, and parables that were reputedly made by Muhammad during the course of his daily life of administering the first Calpihate.
Much the same problein lies with the Hadith as with the Qur'dn as to
how much customary law is contained therein-again, one can find
quite a lot. However, the more important point about the Hadith is
that it was first transmitted orally, with some statements being written
down at an early stage and some not written down until quite late. Furthermore, unlike the Qur'dn which makes claim as a universal doctrine
(because of its divine origin) the Hadith laws were essentially local interpretations and applications of many of Muhammad's "informal" statements. They multiplied at an enormous rate, often used or invented to
serve less than divine purposes. At one stage the statements numbered
into the thousands, with many contradictions and some absurdities.
The important point about them however, is that the statements attempted to specify the more general statements of the Qur'dn and
Sunna.
Because of the extensive disagreements contained in these laws,
there arose, naturally enough, a question as to their legitimacy. A
number of solutions were attempted. First, scholars tried to trace back
the chain of orators to one of Muhammad's disciples. Thus, the Hadiths
typically begin like this one: "Ali ibu Ibrahim, citing his father who
quoted Hammadism 'Isa who quoted al-Qaddah ('Abdallah ibu
Maysum) who quoted Abu 'Abdullah, said. . . ."9 The trouble was
that even these chains of authority were easily fabricated. Later, in the
third century, Al Bakhiri, a deeply religious scholar, gave much authenticity to this method by editing out all those Hadith which he could not
verify by traveling throughout one thousand Shaikhs to track down
their original lines of descent.
Shafi'i--an extension of Malik towards the "consensus of the community." Now dominant in
lower Egypt, Hijaz, Southern Arabia, East Africa, Indonesia and Malaya; and (4) Ahmad
ibn Hanbal which is the smallest and most strict in its observance of the Sunna. Now dominant in Saudia Arabia and Qatar. See H. LIEBESNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR. AND MIDDLE
EAsT (1975).
9 Quoted by AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, IsLAMIc GOVERNMENT 74 (1979).
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A second method has been to systematize the Hadith by comparing
them to the Qur'dn and Sunna, and discarding those that did not conform. This was carried out by the great scholar Malik b. Anas (A.D.
718-96).10 Malik also proposed an additional criterion: the maintenance of those traditions on which there was consensus. However,
Malik's idea of the consent of the community was basically whether a
saying was approved of in Medina, which he considered to be the true
home of Islam. Naturally what was agreed upon in Medina was not
often agreed to in Iraq.
The next important legal theorist, Shafi't (A.D. 768-82) argued for
universal consensus. Unfortunately, given the social, geographic and economic circumstances of the Middle East, the actual testing of this consensus was never possible. Indeed, in 754-55, a treatise was addressed to
the Caliph by Ibu al-Mugaffa' suggesting that the Hadith should be
codified into a different system. Later legal theorists rejected it because
of a pronouncement ascribed to Muhammad:

"...

the disagreement of

my people is a mercy from Allah."'"
This preference for conflict over consensus gave birth to an interesting but complicated relationship among the competing schools. It is
quite possible for a Muslim to join any one of the schools that he wishes,
since each is considered "orthodox." The differences in interpretation
and reasoning between each school are often used as an educative device
12
or heuristic method of arriving at a scholarly, independent judgment.
The upshot of this approach has been that more and more reliance had
to be put on the Islamic scholars as interpreters of the law, especially
Hadith law. Thus, these scholars have become, to varying degrees, ex3
tremely powerful judges.1
Except for some minor disagreements about fasting and certain
rituals, Khomeini's representation of the general form of Islamic Law is
not untypical of basic Islam. As we shall see, the essential area of vast
difference between Khomeimi's law and general Islamic law is in its
political application. 14 It is at this point that we are able to separate
10 A. GUILLAME, THE TRADITIONS OF IsLAM 20-22 (1966).
11 M. KHADDURI, sup-a note 3, at-35.
12 H. LIEBESNY, supra note 8, at 22.
13 Islamic Law became in many respects ajurist's law, with much emphasis on methods of

interpretation (fi)*l&5.

See Weiss, Intertirelationin Islamic Law: The Theoy ofIftih&d, 26 AM. J.

COM'. L. 199 (1978). On interpreting the divine word generally, see W. GRAHAM, DIVINE
WORD AND PROPHETIC WORD IN EARLY IsLAM (1977).
14 To the outsider these differences may seem trivial, just as to the outsider to Christianity,

the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism may seem trivial. However, differences in day-to-day practices (e.g., eating and fasting) are hardly trivial, since they are so
central to all believers' lives. What is meant by "trivial" therefore is usually from the point of
view of the substantive elements of the belief system. And here, one can easily say that there
is more similarity than difference in fundamental beliefs among the four schools of Islam, or
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Khomeini from other Islamic scholars and jurisprudents. Yet before we
do this, we should pause briefly for a look at the form and content of
Islamic criminal justice, which seems soforeign to us in the West. We are
only used to the extremes, with either the simplicity of Wild West justice
or the infinite complexities, contradictions, procedures and "systems" of
modern criminal justice.
II.

FORM AND CONTENT OF ISLAMIC LAW

What is meant by "law"? We hear Khomeini and his followers
speak of Islamic law and it sounds not like law at all, but only like terrible physical punishments. We think of law as Western criminal law
which punishes, but surely not like Islamic law-not so coarsely.
One easy definition of Western criminal law is that it is a set of
proscriptions backed up by negative sanctions, underwritten by
whatever political system is currently in sway. The essential feature,
however, is that it is a set of proscriptions only, that is, it says what not to
do. It is entirely negative. It is not (explicitly at least) a reward system,
or a system of enjoinders, suggesting something to do. This is the first
essential difference between Western criminal law and Islamic law. Islamic law deals with both enjoinders and proscriptions and, thus,
reaches much further into the daily lives of its subjects. The Muslim
must choose between the paths of husn (beauty) and qubh (ugly) or, in
our t~rminology, between good and evil. Along the Muslim path of the
good life are a number of choices in addition to those which are strictly
enjoined (fard) or those that are strictly forbidden (harem).1 5 Here we
come to a second essential difference between Islamic law and Western
law.
The degrees of compliance required by the law are spelled out in
Islamic law, whereas, in Western law, prohibitions are prohibitions and
are stated in absolute terms; that is, you either break the law or you
don't. Yet the absolute terminology in which the laws of the West are
stated rests upon a whole system of blind-passes and distortions which
manage to convey the message that one can probably get away with
breaking certain laws because some laws are enforced more or less than
others. This problem of the amount of compliance is dealt with explicitly by Islamic law, both in the Qur'dn and the Hadith. Allowance is
made, so to speak, for human effort and weakness. In general terms, the
believer has the freedom to fulfill certain recommended actions (mandu-b)
even among the four schools of Islam and the Shiite sect. See I. GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION
TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 31-66 (1981).

15 Much has been written by Islamic scholars on this point. One scholar argued that the
holy quest for the jurisprudent was to find permissions in the Hadith and Qu'ran, since these
were much more difficult to find than were prohibitions. Id
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and to refrain from others (makrah), with the latter clearly not being
strictly forbidden. The following edicts of Khomeini demonstrate the
flexibility and practicality of these Islamic recommendations:
It is forbidden to eat or drink anything that is impure; it is also forbidden to give anything impure to children to eat, whether or not it may be
harmful to them; but it is not forbidden to feed children food which has
16
been only indirectly touched by something impure ....
If a thing becomes impure through having been soiled by the urine of
a milk-fed boy [less than two years old], who has not drunk from sow's
milk, it is enough to wash it all over one time to purify it. Yet it is wise to
17
wash it again a second time ....
If a person crushes a mosquito on his skin and cannot determine
whether the blood therefrom is the insect's or his own, this blood is pure
18

The remarkable social consciousness of many of these enjoinders is
illustrated by the following directive:
If the head of a household notices during the course of a meal that one
or more of the dishes being served are impure, he must impart this information to his guests; but if it is one of the guests who notices it, he is not
obliged to do the same. 19
We can also see in these entreaties, a further striking difference between Islamic law and Western law. Islamic law presents a great deal of
specificity in the realm of everyday life. This applies right down to the
highly detailed instructions Khomeini gives concerning one's most private bodily functions:
During evacuation, one must not squat facing the sun or moon, unless
one's genitals are covered. While defecating, one must avoid squatting exposed to the wind, or in public places, or at the door of one's house, or
under a fruit tree. At the time of evacuation, one must also avoid eating,
dallying, or washing one's anus with the right hand. Finally, one must
avoid20talking, unless one is absolutely forced to or is addressing a prayer to
God.
16 KHOMEINI, stupra
17 Id at 57.

note 1, at 55.

18 Id at 61.
19 Id at 55. The Qur'dn also recognizes the necessity to "bend the rules" a little: "He
[Allah] hath forbidden you only carrion and blood and swine-flesh and that which hath been
immolated in the name of any other Allah; but he who is driven thereto, neither craving nor
transgressing, lo! The Allah is forgiving, Merciful." Qur'in, XVI: 115.
20 KHOMEINI, .stfranote 1, at 41. The authenticity of this and other more strange pronouncements by Khomeini has been questioned recently, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1980, § III,
at 31, especially because Tony Hendra, the editor of AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, SAYINGS OF
THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI (H. Salemson trans. 1979) happens to be a former editor of the
Nationa/Lampioon. I am inclined to think, however, that the material is genuine. Many of the
Khomeini's sayings cross-check with those in ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, and other
sources. The intimate details of some of his pronouncements on defecating and sexual intercourse, are consistent with the Islamic culture and teachings, and in addition are in many
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Similarly, in the areas of daily living concerning sexual intercourse,
business transactions and a host of other daily activities, Khomeini has
issued very specific instructions, and these are derived basically from the
Hadith and the Qur'dn. Again, one can immediately see the difference
between Islamic law and Western law. In the area of the regulation of
everyday life, Western law is poorly, if at all, developed. Conversely, in
the area of criminal law, there is no such specificity on the part of Islam.
It has no extensive and specific statement saying under what conditions
killing is a crime, or when taking property becomes criminal. Yet Western law has a highly specific set of laws about these and many other acts
which are considered to be criminal.
This is not to say that Western law has no specific law on family or
business. It does, but this is achieved by splitting such law off from the
criminal law. In Islamic law the split has not been formalized, or, indeed, even recognized. In other words, Islam does not recognize the distinction between "law" on the one hand, and "social control" on the
other as we do in the West.
There are only about half a dozen "crimes" under Islam-crimes in
the sense that we think of them, which is that they invite serious punishments. 2 1 Some of these crimes and their punishments include:
1. Murder: This crime is generally described as the purposeful
slaying of a believer 22 (killing non-believers is okay. In fact, according
to some interpretations, it is a duty). The punishment is death by the
hand of the victim's family: "And slay not the life which Allah hath
forbidden save with right. Whoso is slain wrongfully, we have given
power unto his heir, but let him not commit excess in slaying. Lo! he
'23
will be helped.
2. Theft: "As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their
hands. It is the reward for their own deeds, an exemplary punishment
from Allah." 24 This is perhaps the most colorful punishment to Western
eyes, where the combination of both reflective and educative aspects of
ways practical health and manners hints that would be appropriate to a backward, largely
illiterate population, living in impoverished conditions, some severely so. Similar Hadith are
reported by I. GOLDZIHER, supra note 14.
21 The actual number of crimes recognized by Islam varies according to the school of law,
but it is generally taken to be about 5 or 6. N. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM
WORLD 37 (1976); H. LIEBESNY, supra note 8, at 228. It is interesting to note that the official
statements by the Saudi Arabian scholars on Islamic Law have tried to derive a much larger
variety of crimes than the small number presented below. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, supra note
2. The larger number of crimes is derived from excessive interpretation of the same small
number of statements in the Qur'dn.
22 "Whosoever slayeth a believer of set purpose, his reward is Hell forever." Qyr&n IV: 93.
Murder is also forbidden in QurS7 IV: 29; V: 32; VI: 152; and XVII: 33.
23 Id at XVII: 33.
24 Id at V: 38.
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punishment are seen. An attempt is made to reflect an element of the
crime in the punishment (i.e., the hands that steal are cut oft), and this
reflection is seen as "teaching a lesson" or perhaps as serving the motive
25
of general deterrence.
3. Adulteg: "The adulterer and the adulteress, scourge ye each
one of them with a hundred stripes . . . and let a party of believers
witness their punishment. '26 We see here another example of an ancient collective punishment: i.e., a punishment in which the community
takes part by witnessing it. This type of punishment was a practice of
the ancient Jews who stoned offenders to death, and has continued
through this century in the West and in many countries of the world
27
with public executions.
4. Unfounded Accuation ofAdultey: "And those who accuse honorable women but bring not four witnesses, scourge them with eighty
stripes and never afterward accept their testimony-they are indeed evil
28
doers."
We may smile at the utter simplicity of this tiny number of crimes.
Yet we would do well to keep in mind the fact that the American public
is informed of crime in American society by a news media which largely
bases its material on the FBI crimes index which includes only a handful
of crimes that are similar to those above, except that adultery is replaced
by auto theft, a clear demonstration of the relationship between crime
and culture.
25 Strictly speaking this is inaccurate since the aim was not to so much deter others
through the threat of punishment, but rather to demonstrate the inherent truth or goodness
in the prohibition. See G. NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE (1978) for a discussion of
reflected punishments. They are the most primitive form of retribution. See also M. A. Kara,
Philosophy of Punishment in Islamic Law (1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New
York at Albany).
26 Qur-an XXIV: 2. In my copy of the Qur'an, the word adultery is often referred to as
"lewdness," which is forbidden in Qurlrn IV: 15, in which the punishment was imprisonment
in her own household (another reflected punishment) "until death take them." The similarity
between this punishment and the burial alive of the vestal virgins who broke their vows is
quite remarkable. See G. NEWMAN, supra note 25, at 27. The Qur'in also forbids adultery.
Quran XVII: 32; XXIV: 2; and XXXIII: 30.
27 A number of scholars have begun to argue for the imitation and borrowing of certain
forms of punishment from one legal system to another. See J. SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE
PENAL SYSTEM (1976), on the transfer of the punishment of slaves to that of criminals, and S.
Christianson, The American Experience of Imprisonment, (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Albany). See G. NEWMAN, supra note 25, for a general
review. However, some Islamic scholars have insisted that Islamic Law is "pure" and untouched by Jewish Law. See Badr, supra note 2. These scholars tend to address themselves to
law rather than forms of punishment. As far as the law is concerned, much has been made of
the requirement that there must be four witnesses to the actual sex act in adultery, the claim
being that this is a case in which the rules of evidence in favor of the accused are much more
stringent than those of the West. See H. LIEBEsNY, supra note 8, at 229.
28 Qur'a XXIV: 4.
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The four Islamic "crimes" are the only classes of action for which
the Qur'dn clearly specifies punishments. There are many other forbidden acts and practices for which dire consequences in Hell are predicted,
but for which no specific earthly punishment is pronounced. These include: usury, slander, spying, criminal conspiracy, hoarding, avarice,
gambling, and drinking "strong" beverages. The only other behavior
for which a clear specification is made is manslaughter (accidental killing of someone from another tribe or family) for which blood-money is
required: "He who hath killed a believer by mistake must set free a
believing slave, and pay the blood-money to the family of the slain
"29

To these four crimes the Mutjahids (religious jurisprudents) have
added a range of other "crimes" generally chosen from among the additional list above. In Iran, prior to the Shah's removal, the Mutjahids
added the crimes of drinking of alcoholic beverages and homosexuality.30 Since the Shah's ousting, Khomeini has reintroduced many more
of the old taboos: women must be veiled, the eating of food prepared by
non-believers is forbidden (it is impure) and gambling is outlawed, to
name but a few. That so many "misdemeanors" exist on the books
without specific punishments leaves open a great deal of discretion on
the part of the religious judge. Indeed some Iranians (prior to the
Shah's fall) complained that the Mutjahids abused their discretion
when, in some cases, they prescribed the death penalty (based on some
interpretation of passages in the Qur'dn or Hadith) or other very severe
punishments for the misdemeanors. This brings us to the next important feature of Islamic law and Khomeini: the role of the religious
jurisprudent.
III.

THE SOCIO-POLITICS OF KHOMEINI'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Much of the Ayatollah Khomeini's book, Islamic Government, is taken
up with fine exegeses on various Hadiths with the aim of showing that
the true and only roles for the Islamic scholar are being the supreme
interpreter of the Qur'dn and Islamic laws, and also being a politician; it
is his duty to see that the law of Islam is carried out. The political role
of the Imam (the prayer leader of Islam-argued to be a direct descen29 Id

at IV: 92.
30 In Iran, the French Penal Code of 1810 was adopted almost wholesale in 1906 and
continued under the Shah's rule (and his father's). Up until the Shah's ousting the Islamic
laws and courts existed side-by-side with the Shah's secular courts. See, G. NEWMAN, COMPARATIvE DEVANc E: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES 217 (1976). He had gradually taken away much of the power of the Islamic courts. We are here speaking of Islamic law
and justice ignoring the intrusion of Western Codes. Many, if not all, Islamic legal systems
have been, and continue to be affected by "foreign" legal codes. See Hill, Comparativeand
HitoricalStudy of Modem Middle Eastern Law, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 279 (1978).
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dent of Muhammad according to the Shiite sect) and his role as an organization man are points of considerable conflict in Islam. Without
going into all of the many varieties of sects and disagreements, we shall
generally sum up the position.
Orthodox Islam became split into a number of different schools of
law, depending on the way in which the Hadiths were interpreted. Nevertheless, all were basically passive interpretations, mostly exemplary of
scholarly differences. It fell to the religious scholars to interpret the
Qur'dn and Hadith (it must be remembered that the Qur'dn to many
requires no interpretation as it is the Holy word itself), although there
was no highly developed "church organization" among such scholars.
At least this is what has been claimed, and certainly the intention was
for scholars to "emerge" according to their own abilities, never to be
3
elected or appointed. '
In actual fact, the differences in the details of the laws expounded
by the Shiite sect compared to the orthodox (Sunni) Muslims (who comprise 80-90% of all Muslims) are not all that great.3 2 Yet the schism
between the Sunni and Shiite is considerable, so much so that the Shiite
developed a whole code of "belief" known as kitman which allows the
Shiite to profess outwardly whatever beliefs are required of him to avoid
persecution, while secretly holding his Shiite beliefs. The schism does
not turn so much on the substance of the law, but rather on the political
role that the Imamate (the Caliphate in Sunni) plays in the Islamic
religion.
The Sunni are satisfied to allow such persons to "emerge" according to their own abilities and knowledge of the Qur'dn and Hadith, so
long as they were of the tribe of Quraysh (one of the early tribes in
Mecca). 33 The Shiites narrowed the qualifications of the Imam still further by insisting that the Imam be a direct descendent of Ali and Fatima.3 4 In this respect various sects within the Shiites have been accused
of worshipping a kind of personality cult, especially as some are inclined
31 In some respects the shunning of a formal church organization is similar to that taken
by Luther in his criticisms of the Catholic Church for its penchant for politics and organizational hierarchy. Nevertheless, in spite of his views, considerable church hierarchies have
grown out of Luther's original ideas. The same has occurred in Islam, although some suggest
that this organization is "invisible" and does not become visible until times of crisis such as
the Iranian revolution. See, G. JANSEN, MIIrANT ISLAM (1979).
32 See supra note 14.
33 The Quraysh, a polytheist tribe of Mecca, were enemies of Muhammad who nevertheless made a peace treaty with them in 627. The treaty was broken in 630 and Muhammad
marched on Mecca thereby establishing it as the political and religious center of the Islamic
empire.
34 Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad; Fatima was the daughter of Muhammad and wife of Ai.
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to give more weight to Ali than to Muhammad himself.35 However, all
Shiites believe that Ali passed on to his male descendents an esoteric
knowledge which placed each successive generation beyond reproach,
made their interpretations of both the Qur'dn and the Hadith infallible
and gave them the divine right to rule. Thus, in contrast to the jurisprudents of orthodox Islam who make their judgments according to scholarly argument and analogical reasoning, which jurisprudents could
question, the Shiite Imam makes his judgments in a much more authoritarian way. His statements are edicts rather than judgments.
Now Khomeini has taken this position one step further. Not only is
the Imam the infallible interpreter of Islamic law, but it is also his duty
to see that this law is carried out. Khomeini cites the following Hadiths
(among others) in support of his position:
"Ali, the amir of the faithful, said that the prophet of God said thrice:
God have mercy upon my successors." So he was asked: "0 Prophet of
God, who are your successors?" He said, "Those who come after me,
transmit my statements and my laws and teach them to the people after
36
me."
After a delicate exegesis of this Hadith, Khomeini concludes:
"There is no place for doubting that the Hadith indicates that the jurisprudent is the ruler and the successor in all affairs." Furthermore,
Khomeini insists that the question, "Who are your successors?" was
meant as a political question while the meaning of the succession is of
secondary importance: "The Muslims interpreted [the Caliphate] as a
position of rule and governance" and not solely a position of
interpretation.
Muhammad ibu Yahya, citing Ahmad ibu Muhammad who quoted
Ibu Mahbus who quoted ali ibu Abi Hamzah said: "I heard Abu-alHasan Musa ibu Ja'far, peace be upon him, say: 'When the faithful dies,
the angels, the lands in which he worshipped God and the gates of heaven
toward which he rose with his actions weep for him, and he leaves in Islam
an irreparable loss because the jurisprudents are the strongholds of Islam
as the Medina's well is its stronghold.' -37
Khomeini interprets this Hadith to mean that the jurisprudents are
entrusted to preserve Islam with all their power,3 8 and by this he means
that they must also be politicians, managers of society, leaders in the
army, defenders of the nation and settlers of disputes. The just jurisprudent is a man of action as well as a man of knowledge and interpreter of
the holy word. As Khomeini exhorts: "Do you think that the sole aim
35 Indeed, some extremists claim that the angel Gabriel miscarried God's revelations to
Muhammad when they were in fact intended for Ali. M. KHADDURI, supra note 3, at 39.
36 KHOMEINI, uftra note 9, at 48.
37 Id at 48.
38 Id at 39.
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of our religion is to have its laws collected in al-Kafi's book and then be
shelved away? Will Islam be preserved if we kiss the Qur'dn, put it on
39
our heads and recite its phrases with a beautiful voice day and night?"
If one accepts Khomeini's position concerning the role of the Imam
as essentially one of action, then the rest easily follows. Since Islam is
seen in large part as a system of law (i.e., the Shari'a, a system of duties
showing the right way to live) it follows that, "the government of Islam
is the government of law so that "only the jurisprudent and nobody else
should be in charge of the government."''4
The final evidence that Khomeini produces is the fact that
Muhammad was both prophet and ruler, a point which brings us back
to an earlier aspect of Islamic law: it is timeless. The laws as revealed to
Muhammad are taken as given, and cannot be changed, which is why
the punishment and crimes, few as they may be, have remained unto
this day. Again, Khomeini makes this quite clear when he says:
Does the jurisprudent have to reduce the number (of lashes for an
unmarried fornicator) to prove that there is a difference between him and
a just
the prophet? No, because the ruler, be he a prophet, an Imam or
41
jurisprudent, is nothing but an executor of God's order and will.

Herein lies the deeply conservative nature of Khomeini's doctrine.
The laws which are fourteen centuries old must apply equally today
because they are of divine origin. In this, he is not too different from
orthodox Islam. But the deeply reactionary nature of his doctrine is the
fact that only the Imam and his jurisprudents can say what, in those
laws, is or is not applicable to the modern world. Furthermore, they
must act politically to see that the modern world is made to conform to
the world of fourteen centuries past. Is this progress? From Khomeini's
point of view this is indeed progress, for he is arousing Islam from its
deep sleep of many centuries to become once again an active, politicized
religion, as are most modem religions. But is it progress from the point
of view of the old Wild West?
IV.

EVALUATING KHOMEINI'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE

There are at least two common attitudes to Khomeini's criminal
justice. One is that we should not evaluate it except in Khomeini's
terms, since this is the only meaningful evaluation that one can make.
In other words, "it may not make sense to us, but it sure as hell does to
him." This is, roughly, the position of the cultural relativists. Each culture is presumed to have equal merit, or more precisely equa/)tstification.
39 Id at 50.
40

Id at 55.

41 Id

at 55.
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It is a position most typical of the relativism that predominates in Western social science. Yet we have not heard any academics defend the
Islamic practice of whipping or cutting off a thief's hands-although
Foucault comes close to it when he decries that Western society has
moved away from punishing the body to a punishment that is no less
than panoptic supervision. 4 2 There are several difficulties with this
brand of relativism, the most serious being that it underwrites, by default, the argument that "might is right" because any culture is answerable only unto itself, and should it decide to expand (as many cultures
have done-Jewish, Christian and Islamic, to name but a few) it simply
follows that the most powerful will win out and become, by definition,
the only "just" culture, since it will be the only one left.
We should not, of course, mix up the notion of understanding a
particular culture with evaluating it. To reach a full understanding of a
culture, one must, no doubt, try to enter into its world. But to assess itespecially from the point of view of justice--one must withdraw from it
and apply a set of evaluative principles.
The evaluative words that are popularly applied to Khomeini's
criminal justice are "primitive," "barbaric," and "totalitarian." In contrast, those applied to Wild West justice are "romantic," "cool," "fair,"
"defender of the weak" and so on. Given these descriptions, what principles should we use to evaluate Khomeini's justice? Should we use
those of the United States, which has come a long way from the justice
of the Wild West and yet still holds a wistful yearning for its return? If
so, then let us extract the moral principles that underlie these evaluative
labels. First, the notions "primitive" and "barbaric" are, roughly, the
opposites of "civilized." The moral principle underlying them is that
Western civilization is good. Second, "totalitarian" refers to the amount
of freedom the common people have. Third, the "coolness" and "fairness" of the Wild West Hero refer to the evenhandedness, the equity and
the impartiality of the just jurisprudent. Fourth, "defender of the weak"
refers to the protection of the common people from tyranny. We may
now evaluate Khomeini's criminal law according to these four
principles.
A.

IS KHOMEINI'S LAW CIVILIZED?

The answer has to be "no," except in one very important respect.
First, let us look at the uncivilized aspects of Khomeini's Islam, and Is42 M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNisH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977) falls just
short of asserting this position. His book opens with a description of the horrendous punishment of drawing and quartering of Damiens. Yet he goes on to severely criticize society's
move away from these physical punishments, almost suggesting that such punishments are
preferable to the panoptic supervision heralded by Jeremy Bentham.
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lam generally. A significant step in civilization is the capacity to symbolize. 43 This is what separates the civilized society from the barbaric
society. Cutting off the hands of thieves, as done in Islam, is a concrete,
not a symbolic, act of punishment. It is not "civilized." In contrast,
Western society uses the highly abstract and symbolic notion of punishment with time in prison. 44 That prison, which is an horrendous punishment in its own right, should be considered "civilized" punishment
carries its own irony-but an examination of this topic would take us
beyond the bounds of this article.
Other theorists of civilization, especially the Freudians have argued
that the decisive fact setting civilized society apart from primitive society is the amount of repression. For each step of progress in civilization,
man must renounce certain of his instinctual desires. The process by
which this succession of renunciations occurs is called sublimation.
Through sublimation instinctual energy is diverted into the well-known
pursuits of civilization, such as science and technology. Sublimation
may take many different directions, and the particular direction that it
should take is the subject of much controversy among theorists of culture.
Also, it is of particular interest that of all the psychoanalytical theorists, one of the most recent and most popular has been Ernest Becker,
who took a tiny step-ever so tiny-to move the theory back to a religious basis. This comes after five decades of atheism. 45 One might well
ask, therefore, whether Khomeini's Islamic law should be automatically
dismissed as uncivilized merely because of its blatant religious basis. We
tend to take the horrendous historical events that heralded the separation of church and state in European and English history as immanent
lessons. The increasing secularization of Western law has been applauded as advancing civilization. Yet Khomeini clearly has a different
view. To him, the peak of Islamic civilization was at the height of
Muhammad's rule-i.e., the seventh century. Khomeini views most of
what has happened since then as a process of decivilization, largely be46
cause of the virtually unbroken line of secular, colonial rulers.
43 This has been argued by a wide range of scholars from many disciplines. See CULTURE
AND THE DIRECTION OF EVOLUTION (S. Garn ed. 1964).

44 It is true, of course, that prison brings with it a different set of woes many of which we
are not especially proud. However, I am aware of no scholar who has advocated its replacement with the bodily punishments which were the precursors to prison. One may note that
progress in the West has been extremely slow in giving up reflected punishments of the
body-we have discarded it only in the past 100 years. We have still not managed to give up
the death penalty.
45 E. BECKER, DENIAL OF DEATH (1973). Jung's theory may perhaps be an exception,
although his is more towards mysticism rather than religion as such.
46 Much of Khomeini's IsLAMIc GOVERNMENT, SUpra note 9, concerns this question. This
is, however, an (understandably) ideologically biased book, and uses history selectively. He
fails to mention the Ottoman rule which imported French criminal codes to ease commercial
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However, this argument does not hold. As we have seen, because of
its barbaric practices of bodily punishments, and its inability to symbolize, Khomeini's religious law is more uncivilized than the secularized
Western law.
Still, in terms of the amount of repression, it is very difficult to say
which culture is more civilized. The enormous number of specific roles
and enjoinders propagated by Khomeini and his forbears since Muhammad, must surely suggest large amounts of repression and, subsequently,
sublimation. Yet if this were the case, what form has this sublimation
taken? It has not been science, since this has been imported largely from
the West. The answer must be ritual, that is, the daily, detailed demands of Islamic worship and the Shari'a (way of life) demanded of all
good Muslims. If one takes the Hadith, the statements of Khomeini,
and the actual behavior of Iranians (both public and private) one finds
a religion very high in both personal ritual and mass ritual. This, from
the psychoanalytic point of view, is where repression takes form. It is
also why Iranian masses are so emotionally powerful, such unruly mobs,
and yet, paradoxically, so seemingly "organized" (mass ritual).
From this point of view, Khomeini may argue that Islamic civilization has progressed considerably. It is another matter, of course,
whether one would prefer a civilization of ritual over a civilization of
science. Certainly, Western society is not as sure about itself as it used to
be-a fact that has made Khomeini's task all the easier:
If Islam were to intervene at this moment (during Colonial rule of
Iran) and to punish an alcohol drinker by whipping him in the presence of
a group of believers, these people will accuse Islam of cruelty and harshness. On the other hand, no objection must be made against the bloody
massacres that have been taking place in Vietnam for fifteen years. .... 47
It is, of course, part and parcel of the psychoanalytic theory of culture that barbarism lies (uneasily) just below the surface of any civilization, 48 including the Islamic. Therefore, it is not a surprise when the
Arabs, Jews, Americans or any other culture periodically resort to mass
killings (usually in the form of wars).
There is another aspect in which the West's civilized ways may, at
least superficially, compare badly with Khomeini's way. A form of sublimation in the West is the rationalization of culture (in the Weberian
sense)49 which results in a multiplicity of rules, and duties related to
transactions (although admittedly kept the Islamic law side-by-side). To be fair, however, he
also castigates those religious scholars who interpreted the Qur'an loosely so as to coincide
with colonial rules.
47 KHoMErim, supra note 9, at 11.
48 S. FREUD, CMLizATioN AND ITS DIsCONTENTs (J. Strachey trans. 1962).
49 M.

1958).

WEBER, THE PROTESTANT AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPrrAsM

(Tr. Parsons

trans.
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formal organizations and bureaucracies. According to Khomeini, Islamic criminal justice is free of bureaucracy. "These foreign laws caused
the Muslim society numerous problems .
keep a case in the courts all [his] life . .

.
.

. a proficient lawyer can
. The case on which the

Shari'a judge used to make a decision in two or three days now takes
twenty years to settle [under Western law]."' 50 The simplicity and clarity of Khomeini's image of justice51 may be something that the West
yearns for. Our current law in all areas has become vastly complicated
and almost impossible to control.
In conclusion it appears that, on balance, Khomeini's Islamic justice is uncivilized though there is some fence-sitting to be done. Perhaps
the opposition between ritual and science as seen by Khomeini is best
eclipsed by the following passage. It is a familiar argument, leveled at
Western society by critics of many different persuasions: "We have
nothing against going to the moon, or setting up atomic installations.
But we too have a mission to accomplish: the mission of serving Islam
-52
and making its sacred principles known to the entire world ....
B.

IS KHOMEINI'S LAW TOTALITARIAN?

The definition of words such as "totalitarian" and "freedom" are
difficult to agree upon. Certainly, we have seen that the Shiite brand of
Islam is highly authoritarian. It recognizes the supreme power of the
Imam, who, supposedly, is above human failings. I emphasize this point
because many of the attributes that the Khomeini argues the Imam
should have, would theoretically prevent the degeneration of the benign
authoritarian aspects of his Islarmic politics into a totalitarian regime.
Governing is not an end in itself. It is a means of value as long as its goal is
noble. If sought as a goal and if all means are used to attain it, then it
degenerates
to the level of a crime and its seekers come to be considered
53
criminals.
Yet, because of the evils that accompany politics ("power corrupts
.") we can only hope that the Imam and his helpers really are above
human failings. 54 If one rejects the super-human qualities of the Imam,
50 KHoMEINI, supra note 9, at 11.
51 It should be clear, however, that we are dealing throughout this article with image.
Whether or not Islamic justice works in practice as the Khomeini claims is another question.
His claim that corruption, trickery, etc. were caused in Islamic justice because of colonial
influence is probably historically wrong- corruption and trickery are as old as Iran's (and most
other government's) histories.
52 KHOMEINI, supra note 9, at 17.
53 Id at 41.
54 This view of government is subject to the usual defects of utilitarian logic: serious evils
may be "justified" because of the worthy goal. If the argument is stated in this way, then
there is no alternative but to evaluate the goal (Islam) as being a religion worthy of the evils
of government. It will be recognized that this philosophical problem was played out by the
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then one is left with a cynical conclusion that, in a political system
which claims supernatural qualities, a totalitarian society is sure to develop. This would occur even though the Qur'dn and Hadith clearly
specify the area of behavior about which the law should have nothing to
say. It is clear from the examples above that there is enormous possibility for discretion in applying the few Islamic laws, and we know from
the history of criminal justice that where there is discretion, there is
room for corruption.
Khomeini denies that the Qur'dn and Hadith concentrate excessively on man's private worship, and advises that the statements of religious interpreters on such personal matters are inferior sources of
legislation. Neverthel6ss, he has made many such pronouncements.
Clearly they are stated with the intention that they be acted on, since
they are so specific:
In any of the detailed Hadith books, you can hardly find more than
three or four chapters concerned with regulating man's private worship
and man's relationship with God and a few chapters dealing with ethics.
The rest is strongly connected with social and economic affairs, with
55
human rights, with administration and with the policy of societies.
Yet, to the outsider, Muslims appear heavily oppressed by their
religion. Women wear veils and hold an appallingly inferior status. All
peoples' lives are d6minated by the ritual demands of the religion. But
as heavily structured as their daily lives or roles may be, one must also
recognize that freedom may be structured into a system of domination
(and, after all, all systems of government are systems of domination).
The Shiite sect, for example, has certain freedoms structured into its
marriage law: "Women may legally belong to a man in one of two
ways; by continuing marriage or temporary marriage .... "56
Clearly, from the point of view of Western morals, which require
extensive renunciations because of the monogamous family structure,
the notion of temporary marriage (which can be of one hour's duration)
and the encouragement of marriage of children (a girl is considered
marriageable over the age of 10), makes for a lot of freedom, but only
from the male adult's point of view. It should also, in theory at least,
avoid the practice of "cheating" in marriage. The severe punishment
for adultery under Islam can be seen to be quite reasonable in this re57
Simigard, given the wide latitude built into the law in other respects.
Christian Church from St. Augustine to Luther, the traditional view being that politics was
the work of the devil.
55 KHOMEINI, suora note
56 KHOMEINI, supra note

9, at 7.
1, at 94. See also I.

GOLDZIHER, supra note 14, at 205-17.

57 Care should be taken with this interpretation. The majority of the statements in the

Qur'in on adultery are leveled at women. In addition it is probable that marriages to 10 year
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larly, the mild punishment (if at all) for adultery in Western society is
easily understood because of the strong emphasis on monogomy and
"continuous marriage." It is of particular interest, however, that the
structured sexual freedom under Khomeini's Islam brings with it a cost:
it is done at the expense of females, especially female children (since the
marriage of a 10 year old girl to an older man may, for economic reasons, be preferable).
The clarity and "unrepressed" nature of Khomeini's position, and
the contrasting illogical and repressive aspects of the West are well
demonstrated by this passage:
Young boys or girls in full sexual effervescence are kept [by Western
laws] from getting married before they reach the legal age of majority.
This is against the intention of divine laws. Why should the marriage of
pubescent girls and boys be forbidden because they are still minors, when
they are allowed to listen to the radio and to sexually arousing music?58
A final respect in which one might argue that there is more freedom
under Khomeini's Islam is that, generally speaking, the people are free,
much more free, from the tyranny of crime. Although it is difficult to
obtain reliable statistics on crime incidence in Islamic countries, especially when some serious crimes (such as murder) may be dealt with
informally (or civilly) and thus not recorded, there is, nevertheless,
enough evidence to suggest that the crime rate in Islamic countries is
probably much lower than in other countries, East or West. 5 9 The official reason that is usually given by Islamic governments is the inherent
goodness of Islam. Nevertheless, one would have expected Western influence and the process of modernization to have heavily influenced the
incidence of crime, since high industrialization and modernization are,
with a few exceptions (Japan being the main one) usually coupled with
high crime rates, especially in the category of property crimes. Certainly, one of the supreme aims of Islamic law is the protection of life
and property: "In an Islamic government, all people are under the protection of the law. No one may endanger their safety, break into their
houses, arrest them, imprison or exile them, or summarily execute them
on the basis of a simple accusation or suspicion. ... ,,60 It remains to
olds are not consummated until much later because of various social and economic
restrictions.
58 KHOMEINI, su-pa

note 1, at 33.

59 This matter is currently under investigation. Certainly the rates provided by the Saudi
Arabian Ministry of Interior are extremely low. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, supra note 2, at 502.
For example it reports a theft rate of 12 per 100,000 population in 1975 compared with a rate
for Western countries of roughly 1,580 per 100,000 population UNITED NATIONS, CRIME
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 26 (1977). However there are methodological difficulties in
making such comparisons. See, Vetere & Newman, InternationalCrime Statistics: An Overview

from a ComparativePerspective, 17 ABSTRACTS
60 KHOMEINI, supra note 1, at 28.

CRIMINOLOGY

& PENOLOGY 251 (1977).
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be seen whether Khomeini will make good on this promise.
C.

IS KHOMEINI'S LAW EQUITABLE?

Right now, the most serious charge brought against the criminal
justice system of the West is that it is inequitable. People receive different sentences for the same crime, the laws are structured and enforced in
such a way as to discriminate against the poor, and so on.6 ' This has, of
course, been the criticism of Western criminal justice since Beccaria and
Bentham,6 2 whose main concern then was the unbridled discretion allowed to judges in sentencing. Yet, we have seen earlier that the "just
jurisprudent" of Khomeini's is given total discretion, because he is seen
as having esoteric, quasi-divine powers of interpretation of Islamic law.
When one adds to this the simplicity and lack of criminal laws under
Islam, and, the wide variety of circumstances to which they must be
applied, one might expect inequity to follow from such broad discretion
63
and the necessity to judge by analogy.
As for coolness and fairness of the judge, we have many laws in the
West designed to keep mass hysteria, the press and so forth at bay from
the criminal trial. Whether this works is another matter. It boils down
to whether we can "have faith" in our institutions and institutional safeguards. In contrast, in Iran one must have faith, not in institutional
safeguards, but in the holiness of the judge. If only the "just jurisprudent" were, unfailingly, as Khomeini describes, not a seeker of gains, not
blood thirsty, not greedy or a taker of bribes, not a seeker of leadership
of the Muslims, not ignorant, not rough or fearful, but knowledgable in
Islamic law, and just. If we could believe that the just jurisprudent
would at all times display these qualities, then perhaps we could believe
that equity would follow.6
D.

DEFENSE OF THE POOR?

Khomeini says, "Islam, as you know very well solved the problem
of poverty and decided at the very outset that the alms are for the
61 J. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (1979).

62 J. BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Prtnciles of Morals and Legislation, in COLLECTED

WORKS U. Burns & H.L.A. Hart cds. 1970).
63 It may not necessarily follow that fewer laws automatically mean broad discretion.
Pepinsky has argued that the more specificity in the law, the more discretion, since there are
(1976).
more issues to interpret. H. PEPINSKY, CRIME AND CoNFLir
64 This does, however, give the benefit of the doubt to Khomeini. We know from the
sorry history of criminal justice that many injustices have occurred as unintended consequences of good intentions. On the other hand one might argue that it is because we have
replaced holy people with unholy institutions and bureaucracies that we suffer these
problems!
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poor."'6 5 Yet in another passage he says, "[t]he financial taxes legislated
by Islalm do not contain anything to indicate that they were legislated
to feed the poor. . . they indicate that their legislation was for the pur'66
pose of securing the expenditures of a major sovereign state."
Most religions claim to be concerned with the protection of the
weak and the poor. Islam is no exception. It is clear, however, that it is
through chanty (i.e., personal alms giving-one of the requirements of
Islam) that the poor are to be aided, not through "government spending," as we would call it. There is little doubt that Khomeini sees the
traditional taxes collected by Islamic officials as necessary for underwriting the political structure of his Islamic republic. This is why many of
the clergy developed large landholdings in Iran, and had much of it
taken away during the Shah's "white revolution." It is hard to see how
a political system which justifies its collection of taxes purely on the basis of buttressing its own sovereignty (although it may be more honest
about it) is oriented seriously to the defense of the weak and poor.
As to whether the United States system is or is not oriented to defense of the weak and poor-well, that is a matter of hot controversy.
Let us say in comparison, that there is, at least on the surface, more
government assistance to the poor (whether this constitutes their "defense" is admittedly another matter). Also, "alms giving" (charities) in
the United States is certainly a very big business. I leave it to the reader
to choose between giving to an organized charity as against to a begger
in the street.
Once again we are confronted by the Western penchant for institutional solutions to social problems, whereas those of Khomeini's Islam
are left at the individual level. Indeed, Khomeini's only concern at the
institutional level of society is with one institution-that of the power of
the politico-religious institution of Islam. Today, the apparent disorganization of his "institution" belies the basic ethic of the Shiite sect. It
depends on charismatic individuals for government, not on institutions.
Khomeini's men are not organization men. They are their own men.
When they are powerful, only justice and good can follow.
And it's the same with Wild West Justice. But we know, of course,
that this kind of justice can only happen at the movies.

65 KHOMEINI, suPra

66 Id at 21.

note 9, at 91.

